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(Sgd.) *Roy P. O'Brien*

Date *1/2/71*

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NEAR EASTERN

FILE No. *NEJ 10/7*

(1-26)  
(Part )

TITLE:

FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES IN JORDAN.

REFER TO

REFER TO

REFER TO

NAME

(and dept. when necessary)

TO SEE:

DATE

NAME

(and dept. when necessary)

TO SEE:

DATE

NAME

(and dept. when necessary)

TO SEE:

DATE

*Reg.*

*30/1*

*C.L.*

*17*

*28/7*

*CWL*

*1/2*

*30/1*

*C.L.*

*18*

*29/4*

*JA Dept.*

*1*

*18/2*

*P.H.*

*18*

*15*

*Reg*

*18/2*

*Reg*

*4/5*

*Mr Macrae*

*4, 5, 6, 7*

*18/2*

*C.L.*

*18*

*15*

*Reg*

*26/2*

*Regy*

*1/1*

*Mr Long*

*8*

*6/3*

*C.L.*

*20*

*24/8*

*Mr Long*

*(9)*

*6/3*

*Regy*

*22/8*

*Reg*

*9/3*

*C.W.L.*

*(23) (24)*

*27/8*

*CWL*

*(20)*

*9/3*

*Regy*

*27/8*

*DTM*

*(22)*

*9/3*

*C.W.L.*

*(24)*

*27/8*

*PRMH*

*11*

*9/3*

*Regy.*

*(25)*

*27/9*

*CUL*

*24*

*18/3*

*C.W.C.*

*(25)*

*27/9*

*Reg*

*23/3*

*A.C.D.M.*

*(25)*

*4/9*

*CWL*

*(13)*

*13/1*

*Reg.*

*(25)*

*4/9*

*Reg*

*13/1*

*C.W.L.*

*(26)*

*4/9*

*C.L.*

*15*

*24/1*

*C.L.*

*16*

*27/4*

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USEFUL INFORMATION RELATED TO CONTENTS OF THIS FILE

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① - NET 10/6

② + ③ - NET 3/322/1

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OTHER RELATED FILES:



(10/8)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 26 JAN 1970 NEJ 10/7.
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SECRET



British Embassy,  
AMMAN.

14 January, 1970

Dear Evans,

Arms Sales to Jordan

Preambly  
defensively; an  
anti-aircraft  
regiment cannot  
be used to  
initiate  
offensive  
operations.

NEJ 10/3  
(on another  
sheet)

In paragraph 5 of his letter to you of 5 January Alan Urwick reported that the Pakistanis were telling the Americans that their troops are in Jordan exclusively for training purposes.

2. My Pakistani colleague here has no such inhibitions. He has taken the line with me that the troops are here to fight and that more like them are available in Pakistan. He added that his country felt they could do no less than send a fighting detachment given the strength of Moslem feeling about the occupation of Jerusalem and the particularly close ties between Pakistan and Jordan resulting from Prince Hassan's marriage. But he went on to say that by providing a fighting contingent the Pakistanis hoped, if it ever became necessary, to be able to exercise a restraining influence on the Jordanians and to nip in the bud any half-planned military adventures which they might be contemplating.

R.E.  
26/1.

3. The Iranian Ambassador tells me that the Pakistani spoke to him in the same sense, adding the suggestion that the Iranian Government might think of contributing the cost of additional Pakistani troops sent to Jordan. This suggestion went down like a dose of salts.

ben? or badly?

4. With reference to paragraph 4 of Alan Urwick's letter you will now know that the American team is expected to arrive in Jordan this week. We are in touch with the Americans about this and the Defence Attaché and his staff will be seeing the visitors.

(Copy to A.D.) Mr. Lohg  
Mr. Mackintosh  
S.A. Dept  
Lrie.

Yours ever,

Philip Adams  
(Philip Adams)

R.E. 26/1.

R. M. Evans Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cc: Mr. A.B. Urwick, Washington,  
Mr. D.H.T. Hildyard, C.M.G., D.F.C., U.K. Mission  
to the United Nations, New York.

SECRET



NNNN  
BBC B

Pl. enter am 28/1

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 2/11/50 NET 10/7.
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(2)

B74 PAKISTAN AIR FORCE CHIEF IN JORDAN

AMMAN RADIO AIR MARSHAL RAHIM KHAN, COMMANDER OF THE PAKISTAN AIR FORCE, ARRIVED IN AMMAN THIS EVENING ON AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO JORDAN WHICH WILL LAST SEVERAL DAYS.

pm  
am  
30/1

AIR MARSHAL KHAN WAS RECEIVED AT THE AIRPORT BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES, MAJ.-GEN. SHARIF NASIR BIN JAMIL AND CHIEF OF STAFF MAJ.-GEN. ALI AL-HIYARI.

END BBC MON 27/1 JMA (KY) 2138



Copy for NEJ 10/17 Enter - pa  
New Test Dept. (Mr Evans) - 7/11

Original &  
minutes

FSP/2/2



BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,  
RAWALPINDI.

Mr Wilford.

Mr Weller.

15 December, 1969.

Mr. Long. You are  
considering this  
letter. R.E. S/1.

Pakistani Troops for Jordan

THIS IS A COPY.

THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED  
IN THE DEPARTMENT  
OF THE PUBLIC

The purpose of this letter is to set down such meagre background information to the American disclosures as we have been able to glean here.

2. The only direct references we have seen to the despatch of Pakistani combat troops to Jordan are:

- a) a report in the local Urdu-language newspaper (Nida-i-Millat) of 16 October which headlined a report in the "Observer" that King Hussain had indicated that Pakistan was considering providing combat troops to Jordan to be deployed on the eastern front. The report added that Pakistan had apparently taken the decision following the Rabat Conference, and that Jordanian forces would be strengthened by some infantry and paratroops from Pakistan. The paper recalled that Jordan had been receiving military advice and technical aid from Pakistan since June. Our informal enquiries made at the time suggested that the "Observer" report was speculation;
- b) at the end of President Yahya Khan's official visit to Iran in November when (according to the local English-language press) he was asked at Tehran Airport whether Pakistan would provide military assistance to the Arabs in view of its being an ideological state based on Islam. He is reported to have replied: "Pakistan is not a super power. It has its own problems of defence. The first duty of a country should be to defend itself first". However, later in the day on his return to Karachi he was asked if he had discussed the question of Palestine with the Shah and replied: "We discussed the problem thoroughly at Rabat recently. We have made some plans to help the Palestinians."

3. On the same day as this latter interview (4 November) the Assistant Defence Adviser at Karachi reported that 25 army trucks, containing about 500 armed soldiers, had entered the West Wharf at Karachi docks. It was of course possible, given the internal situation in East Pakistan, that the troops were en route to the East wing, and we asked Karachi whether they could identify the vessel on which the troops sailed. Unfortunately they were unable to do so.

/4. Using

I. J. H. Sutherland, Esq.,  
South Asian Department,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.

PA  
Ava  
in

SECRET





4. Using the report in Nida-i-Millat and President Yahya's remarks on 4 November, Derek March asked the Director for the Middle East at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 28 November whether Pakistan was considering the despatch of combat troops to Jordan. He was given a categorical denial, and told that the speculation had begun as a result of an article in the London "Observer" (March had not referred to the "Observer" report). The Director however said that having regard to the close links between Pakistan and Jordan which had been cemented by the marriage earlier this year of King Hussain's brother to the daughter of the late Mr. Ikramullah, a former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Pakistan would be increasing the number of instructors and the size of its technical assistance programme in Jordan. The Director suggested that this was what President Yahya had had in mind when he spoke about plans to help the Palestinians.

5. Given the evidence we now have about the despatch of Pakistani troops to Jordan, it is tempting to believe that the M.F.A. are trying to mislead us. I do not think however that this is necessarily the right conclusion to draw. It is more likely, and in some ways more disturbing, that at Director level in the Ministry little is known about high-level decisions of this kind. It is quite on the cards that there has been an important change in Pakistani foreign policy without the M.F.A. being consulted. The risk is that the military men who control Pakistan at the moment could have taken a decision committing Pakistan to a military involvement in the Arab/Israel dispute from which, given the recent freedom accorded to the press to play up anti-Israel feeling, it would be difficult for any successor government to extract itself.

6. It is hard to believe that President Yahya is not aware of the distinction between technical assistance and/or instructors on the one hand, and armed troops on the other. He must however have come under heavy pressure at Rabat to provide the one commodity which Pakistan has in abundance, i.e. well-trained troops. It is possible that other Muslim countries which have money but not men may have agreed to finance some of Pakistan's defence equipment purchases in return for the despatch of a token force. All this however is speculation. The only way in which we can investigate the reports at this end is by putting a question directly to the Foreign Secretary or to the President himself. The High Commissioner can certainly do this: but it might be better to delay until there is more evidence that an anti-aircraft battalion has been seen either at Basra or in Jordan.

*W. S. Murray*  
*gjm*

(Giles Bullard)

Copied to:

B. L. Strachan, Esq., Amman  
P. McKearney, Esq., Baghdad  
T. A. K. Elliott, Esq., C.M.G., Washington  
D. F. Murray, Esq., Tehran



LDL 068/12

RR FCO

GR67

ROUTINE FROM AMMAN

TO MOD D14

TELEGRAM NO FOH 120850Z

12 FEBRUARY

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO DA BAGHDAD  
FROM DA AMMAN

IRAQI TROOPS IN JORDAN.

MEMBERS OF MY STAFF CARRIED OUT RECCE IN MAFRAQ AREA ON 10 FEBRUARY. IN BDE AREA, APPROX BR 3583, POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION WAS MADE OF A NUMBER OF OT62 (TOPAS).

DEFENCE COMMEN PASS ROUTINE TO DIA

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO DEFENCE COMMCEN AND BAGHDAD  
SIR P ADAMS


NNNN

[Sent to D.C.C.]

Prf.

Adm  
182





SECRET

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(5)

CYPHER

Enter am  
x.p.a. 13/2

PRIORITY

("Frey-Turner-John")

DME E 46/12 LDL 79/12

FF FCO

GE 60

CYPHER CAT A

PRIORITY FROM AMMAN

TO MOD DI4

TELEGRAM NO FOR 121335Z

12 FEBRUARY 1970

SECRET

FROM DA AMMAN

YOUR FOR 111130Z FEB REFERS.

WE HAVE NO NEWS YET OF ANY PAKISTANI ARMY UNIT OTHER  
THAN AN AIR DEFENCE REGIMENT ARRIVING IN JORDAN AND  
TEND TO THINK THIS MAY BE THE PRESS QUOTE CATCHING UP  
UNQUOTE. US COLLEAGUES ALSO HAVE NO NEWS ON THIS  
SUBJECT.

DEFENCE COM CEN PASS PRIORITY TO DI4

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFENCE COM CEN

SIR F ADA'S

PA,  
Adm  
15/2

SENT TO FCO

Distributed to
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Defence Training & Supply Dept
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
EN CLAIR  
PRIORITY RAWALPINDI  
TEL NO 143

TO F C O LONDON  
14 FEBRUARY 1970

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO F C O TEL NO 143 OF 14 FEBRUARY BY REF TO AMMAN,  
TEL AVIV, DELHI, WASHINGTON AND TEHRAN.

PAKISTANI PERSONNEL IN JORDAN.



ACCORDING TO TODAY'S PAKISTAN TIMES, AN OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN HAS DISCOUNTED RECENT AMERICAN PRESS REPORTS THAT PAKISTAN HAD QUIETLY MOVED INTO JORDAN AN INFANTRY REGIMENT COMPRISING TWO TO THREE THOUSAND MEN. SPOKESMAN IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT PAKISTAN HAS BEEN PROVIDING JORDAN AND OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES WITH MILITARY TRAINING ASSISTANCE FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS AND THAT PRESS REPORTS ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF PAKISTAN PERSONNEL IN JORDAN ARE "HIGHLY EXAGGERATED".

FCO PASS WASHINGTON

SIR C. PICKARD [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Private Secretary

I understand that the Secretary of State has asked for a short note on the presence of Pakistani troops in Jordan. I attach a memorandum below.

Tel 143  
from Kawalpudi  
attached.

J. F. Tripp

(J. F. Tripp)  
16 February, 1970.

c.c.

Mr. Priestly

PA.

Acem

1872

SECRET



SECRET

Pakistani Troops in Jordan

A Pakistani anti-aircraft regiment, equipped with 40 m.m. guns, arrived in Jordan in early December. They came by sea to Esra and thence overland to the vicinity of H.4 and H.5 airfields, in the east of Jordan, where they are now thought to be deployed. The Jordanians are badly in need of this type of unit.

2. These movements have been given exaggerated publicity in recent American press reports which suggested that Pakistan had quietly moved into Jordan an infantry regiment of 2 to 3,000 men. In fact, the number of men in the anti-aircraft regiment is probably about 500.

3. There has also been small Pakistani military training mission in Jordan for some time. In addition, two Pakistani air-force officers are to be seconded to run a small air force mission to Jordan (apparently to help instruct on F.104 Star-Fighters, which the Americans are providing).

4. Press reports reveal that both the Indians and the Israelis are aware of this development. Both might be expected to present it in its least favourable light: this may perhaps account for the recent exaggerated press reports.

5. However, it seems unlikely President Yahya Khan would have agreed to send anything that, in practical terms, amounts to more than a token force.

Near Eastern Department,

16 February, 1970.

SECRET



J.3/1

RAJASTHAN.

27 January 1970

Dear Sir,

Pakistani Troops for Jordan (3)

Since I wrote my letter J.3/1 of 15 December, rumours that a Pakistan anti-aircraft battalion has gone to Jordan have become cocktail party conversation in Islamabad. In addition one of the U.S. Military Attaches has told our Defence Adviser that the Pakistan Secretary for Defence, Mr. Ghiaus Uddin Ahmed, had confirmed to him that troops had gone, but had added that the move was merely an extension of the existing Pakistani training programmes in Jordan.

2. You ought also to know that our Australian colleagues have shown us, in strict confidence, a copy of a report to Canberra from the Australian Embassy in Washington about U.S. reactions to the despatch of the Pakistani battalion to Jordan. It appears that the Americans are still puzzled by the initiative taken by Pakistan in sending armed troops, although there is an inclination to accept Pakistani assurances that the troops are there merely for training purposes and that when the task is completed they will be withdrawn and their guns left behind for the use of the Jordanian Army.

3. I expect too you will have seen the enclosed item from the Times of India of 15 January which suggests that the Israelis are aware of the presence of Pakistani troops. On the despatch of Pakistani Air Force Officers our Air Adviser comments that Air Commodore Abbasi is to be posted as head of a Pakistani Air Force Mission to Jordan, accompanied by a Wing Commander who is a fully qualified flying instructor for the F.104 Starfighter.

4. We cannot add anything much to this story without making an approach at Foreign Secretary level or even to the President himself. The High Commissioner's offer to do this (paragraph 6 of my letter under reference) still stands. But as things are we are likely to get the same response as that given by Mr. Ghiaus Uddin Ahmed to the Americans. If you want such an approach made it would be useful if you or Strachan in Amman could send us any additional hard information you may have which is not classified.

5. There has been no official or press comment on the despatch of combat troops to Jordan and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have from the start taken the same line as Mr. Ghiaus Uddin Ahmed. It is odd that the leaky government machine has been able to keep this important development secret.

*Giles Bullard*  
(Giles Bullard)

I.J.M. Sutherland, Esq.,  
South Asian Department,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.

c.c. without enclosure to:

B.L. Strachan, Esq., Amman,  
T.A. Elliott, Esq., Washington,  
D.F. Murray, Esq., Tehran,  
J.D. Hennings, Esq., C.M.G., New Delhi (with copy of my letter of

P. McKearney, Esq., Baghdad,

15 December 1969).

SECRET

FSP 10/7  
(SOUTH ASIAN)



Times of day

10 11 12

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CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Walker

cc Mr. Evans, Near Eastern Dept.

PAKISTANI TROOPS FOR JORDAN

Mr. King of the U.S. Embassy introduced me yesterday to Mr. Kux of the U.S. Embassy in Rawalpindi who was passing through London on his return to Pakistan after a brief visit to Washington. In the course of a general conversation about the political situation in Pakistan I asked what were the views of the U.S. Government on the reports about the despatch of Pakistani troops to Jordan.

2. Mr. Kux said that the State Department had been concerned about the effects on United States public opinion. There was little enthusiasm either amongst the public or in Congress for aid to either India or Pakistan and the Administration had feared that, at a time when the Pakistanis were seeking an increase in aid from Western donors, the news of Pakistani involvement in Jordan might have an adverse affect upon the aid programme. The U.S. Embassy in Rawalpindi had raised the subject last month with the Pakistani Ministry of External Affairs. Mr. Kux added that it had been their intention to make representations, which the Americans would have thought to be futile and counter-productive, but merely to enquire whether the reports initially obtained only from secret sources but by that time a common gossip in Islamabad, were accurate. The Pakistanis have replied, predictably, that it had always been their policy to support the Arabs, that they had had a Defence Mission in Amman for some time and that the additional troops were for defensive purposes only. They also argued that if they had not provided assistance to King Hussein it would come from the Soviet Union or other less desirable sources, and they understood that these considerations were also in the mind of the U.S. Government in providing military assistance to Jordan.

3. Mr. Kux went on to say that the U.S. Government had also had, more recently, an approach from the Israelis. This was, however, in a relatively minor key. Mr. Kux agreed that the Israelis were probably not excessively concerned about the presence of Pakistani troops as they could count on the Pakistani Government to strengthen King Hussein and the more moderate elements in Jordan.

4. I am recording separately one or two other points which arose in the course of my conversation with Mr. Kux on the economic and political situation, but in the context it is perhaps worth recording that he thought that the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, in recent months, detected an increase in pan-Islamic feeling amongst the junior officers within the Pakistan

CONFIDENTIAL

Army/

NEJ 10/7

/not



CONFIDENTIAL

|| Army. It was difficult to point to any specific instance but, in the Embassy's view, the new generation of officers which was now emerging and which had not been subjected to British influence and training tended to take a more extreme pro-Arab line and, in domestic affairs, to support those parties within Pakistan which advocated a stricter observance of the Islamic State principles.

(I. J. M. Sutherland)  
S. Asian Dept.  
17 February, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL



9

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6/3

CYPHER CAT A

PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO FOH 051200Z MAR

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TO MOD DI4  
REGISTRY NO. 10

NEJ 10/7

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO FOH 051200Z MAR

INFORMATION TO DA RAWALPINDI AND DA BAGHDAD.

FROM DA AMMAN

MOD FOH 041055Z MAR NOT TO RAWALPINDI OR BAGHDAD

WE WILL CERTAINLY BE ON THE ALERT FOR ANY INCREASES IN

PAKISTANI TROOPS IN JORDAN. WE HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY

RECENT INCREASES, NEITHER HAVE THE AMERICANS. YOU WILL

APPRECIATE THAT OUR MOVEMENTS ARE RESTRICTED BUT IT WILL HELP

IF RAWALPINDI CAN INFORM US AS TO TYPES OF PAKISTAN VEHICLES,

POSSIBLE MARKINGS, AND EQUIPMENT WHICH MIGHT BE SENT TO JORDAN

SO THAT WE CAN SPOT THEM IF THE CHANCE OCCURS. WE THINK THAT

MOVEMENT THROUGH IRAQ, AS ON THE PREVIOUS OCCASION, MAY BE

FIRST INDICATION. ONLY PAF PILOTS OF WHICH THE AIR ATTACHE

IS AWARE, WHO ARE ACTUALLY FLYING WITH THE RJAF ARE THREE

AT H5 ON F 104S, HEADED BY AN EXPERIENCED SQUADRON LEADER AND

UP TO FIVE WITH THE RJAF HUNTER FORCE AT MAFRAQ.

AA HAS HEARD THAT A PAF WING COMMANDER WILL BE ARRIVING IN JORDAN

IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR FLYING DUTIES.

DEFENCE COMMCEN PASS PRIORITY TO DI4

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO RAWALPINDI, BAGHDAD AND DEFENCE COMMCEN.

SIR P ADAMS

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Pl. enter (Foreign Troops in Jordan) on 9/3

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NER 10/7

SECRET TO JORDAN TEL. FOR 7.7 8Z 1977 P.F. 1 TEL  
EFFECTS AMMAN, 9/3/77.

TELETYPE FOR 7.7 8Z 1977. WE HAVE ...  
... COLLEAGUE AS RECENTLY ASKING ...  
... WERE ALL THAT WERE ...  
... THROUGH ... WE LIKELY ...  
... STREET ... MOST VALUABLE. ...  
... PREVIOUS ... FORTUITOUS AND SUCH ...  
... LIKELY TO REPEAT ITSELF.

Ad. N. East 9.

pr  
10/3

PLEASE PASS TO PHOTOGRAPH.

to Resale and Amman.

9/3

SECRET

S... 08:17Z ...  
P... 0745Z ...

SECRET



"KAYHAN"

Reference

1 MARCH 1970

W 12

in London  
MIM  
9/3  
to

~~Amir~~

Amir

pm  
10/3

# Iraq claim 'complete fabrication' says Thant

UNITED NATIONS, Saturday, UPI.  
SECRETARY General U Thant, angered by Iraqi government claims that he had asked for withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Jordan, today called in the Iraqi mission Charge d'Affaires to tell him they were a "complete fabrication."

Thant summoned Adnan Raouf at noon today "to protest formally and ask for explanation" of stories in the Iraqi press and on Baghdad Radio, quoting Iraqi Minister of Interior, Gen. Saleh Mehdi Ammash, as saying that Thant had requested the Iraqi pull-out and that the request had been turned down.

A U.N. spokesman said this was a "complete fabrication" and that Thant "had never seen the request and never received a reply."

When the story broke on Wednesday, the U.N. spokesman immediately denied it and observers here pointed out that the Secretary General in any case would not have the authority to make such a request.

The U.N. spokesman said Thant was "considering sending a written protest" to the Iraqi government and if he so decides, it would be made public here.

If Thant does that, observers said, it would be unprecedented in his relations with U.N. member states.

Raouf told newsmen after his half-hour meeting with Thant that the Secretary General did not make the protest quite as formal as indicated by the U.N. spokesman.

Raouf said he knew nothing about the basis of the published reports and was urgently querving Baghdad for an explanation.

"I am just carrying the message (from Thant) and the sooner I send it the better."

## Iraq accepts mediation

BEIRUT,  
Saturday, AP.

IRAQ has accepted an offer from Kuwait to mediate its dispute with neighbouring Iran, Arab diplomatic sources reported here today.

Both Iraq and Iran massed troops on their common border after Iraq accused Iran of masterminding an abortive plot to overthrow the Baghdad government.

The sources said the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister was expected to go to Tehran shortly.



BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

28 February 1970

(2/3)



Dear Peter,

Alleged Note from U Thant  
to the Iraq Government

Under a splash headline reading "Firm Refusal by Iraq to Pull Out of Eastern Front. U Thant's request turned down" the Barrhad Observer on 26 February started something of a seven day wonder in the Diplomatic Corps here. The article went on to declare

"General Saleh Mehdi Ammash, RCC Member and Minister of Interior has disclosed that UN Secretary General U Thant had sent a note to the government of Iraq asking for the withdrawal of the Iraqi Army from the Eastern Front.

"The Revolutionary Government sent a firm reply to U Thant serving notice on him that the Iraqi forces were in the Eastern Front in keeping with the Arab collective defence agreement, General Ammash said. The UN had better demand of Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and carry out the Security Council's resolution before asking Iraq to withdraw its forces."

It then explained that Ammash's disclosure had been published in the "current issues" of Al-Musawar and Akher Sa'a in Cairo. The story of U Thant's note sounded improbable, but since the Ba'ath Party Congress has been making Ministers even more inaccessible than usual, members of the Corps were reduced (as happens not infrequently) to asking each other for information. No-one had any. At least one of my colleagues, the Italian, despatched urgent telegrams to his (non-existent) Government. Everyone was at a loss.

2. On the following night the Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs put in an appearance at a party given by the visiting Canadian Ambassador from Tehran and a pincer movement was rapidly mounted on him.

3. Ni'ma declared that the whole thing had been a mistake. No such note had been received. It was a malicious hare started by Tekoa in New York.

/4.

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.

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4. This was all we could get out of him. It does not explain why a controlled newspaper should have been allowed to go to town with the story - though various possible explanations present themselves. As for the origins of the story, Cairo can no doubt throw some light. No-one here seems to have seen the relevant issues of Al-Musawar and Akher Sa'a.

*Yours ever*

*John*

(H.G. Salfour Paul)


Copies to: Chanceries at Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Tel Aviv  
and U.K. Mission to the United Nations, New York.

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5. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Baghdad, Amman, Beirut, Tel Aviv and U.K. Mission in New York.

*Yours truly,*  


(P. R. H. Wright)

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(2/2)

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
CAIRO.

18 March, 1970.

Mr. Hinchcliffe  
Miss Beckett

1820/3

23/3

See letter

Alleged Note from U Thant to the  
Iraq Government

In his letter 2/3 to you of 2 February A.M. Ambassador in Baghdad reported that the "Baghdad Observer" on 26 February had carried an account originating in the Cairo press concerning a purported disclosure by General Ammash about exchanges between U Thant and the Iraqi Government.

2. "Al Nassawar" carried this report on 20 February in the terms quoted in the above letter. "Akher Sa'a" on 18 February also mentioned comments by General Ammash, but not the ones of interest.

3. General Ammash's comments were in reply to a question put to him in Cairo by "Al Nassawar's" Arab Affairs Editor, Mustafa Nabil, as to whether the Eastern Front was doing what was expected of it at the present moment. General Ammash replied inter alia that preparations to strengthen the Eastern Front were steadily progressing and that it was hoped that the Front would shortly be able to play its full part. After saying that it must be borne in mind that the Eastern Front was extremely long, he went on to draw attention to the Secretary General's request about Iraqi troop withdrawals. Mustafa Nabil has told us that the Military and Press Attaches at the Iraqi Embassy were also present during the interview. Afterwards the Press Attach rang Nabil and told him that General Ammash had made a mistake. What had happened was that the Israelis had sent to the Secretary-General a complaint about the presence of Iraqi troops on the front line, which the Secretary-General had forwarded in a purely routine way, without comment to the Iraqi authorities. It was, however, too late to alter his story for the magazine. Nabil is a reputable journalist and we have no reason to doubt the accuracy of his account.

4. Al Ahram of 14 March carried a D.F.A. report from the United Nations of the preceding day, which you have no doubt seen, that according to a U.N. spokesman the Iraqi delegation had denied that General Ammash had ever said that Iraq had refused the Secretary-General's request to withdraw Iraqi forces from Jordan.

/5.

J. P. Tripp, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W. 1.

CONFIDENTIAL



Pl ante French troops  
in Jordan am 2/4

M. Long NCI (14)

NNNN

CCA765 EPA225

1425 : NIGHTLEAD TROOPS:

AMMAN, APRIL 9, REUTER -- SAUDI ARABIA IS JOINING SYRIA AND IRAQ IN BUILDING UP THE STRENGTH OF THE ARAB ARMIES ALONG THE EASTERN FRONT WITH ISRAEL.

MORE TROOPS WILL ARRIVE IN JORDAN WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO JOIN THE SAUDI FORCE WHICH HAS SERVED HERE SINCE THE 1967 WAR, ACCORDING TO A SAUDI ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY.

RELIABLE REPORTS FROM DAMASCUS SAY THE SYRIANS HAVE BEEN CALLING RESERVISTS BACK TO THE COLOURS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR FORCES ALONG THE GOLAN HEIGHTS FRONT.

SYRIA HAS SHOWN INCREASING AGGRESSIVENESS THIS YEAR ALONG THIS HITHERTO QUIET FRONT AND REPORTED SHOOTING DOWN SEVEN ISRAELI PLANES LAST THURSDAY IN THE LATEST OF A SERIES OF SHARP AIR AND LAND BATTLES SOUTH OF DAMASCUS.

FRESH FIGHTING IS EXPECTED IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS AS THE SYRIANS KEEP UP THEIR CAMPAIGN TO TAKE PRESSURE OFF THE SUEZ CANAL FRONT, THE DAMASCUS REPORTS SAID.

THE SEMI-OFFICIAL BAGHDAD NEWSPAPER AL THAWRA SAID YESTERDAY THAT SINCE THE MARCH 11 SETTLEMENT OF THE KURDISH REBELLION, IRAQI UNITS HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM NORTH IRAQ TO THE EASTERN FRONT. THERE HAS BEEN NO OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION HERE OF THESE TROOPS MOVEMENTS.

MORE LS/TB

NNNN

CCA766 EPA226

1428 : NIGHTLEAD TROOPS 2 AMMAN:

THE RIVAL BAATH PARTY LEADERSHIP IN DAMASCUS HAS REPEATEDLY ATTACKED IRAQ IN RECENT WEEKS FOR ITS ALLEGED FAILURE TO MEET ITS COMMITMENTS ON THE EASTERN FRONT, WHERE IT HAS AT PRESENT ABOUT 12,000 MEN IN JORDAN AND 6,000 IN SYRIA.

IT WAS THOUGHT LIKELY THAT TROOPS FREED FROM POLICE DUTIES IN THE KURDISH NORTH WOULD BE SENT TO JORDAN RATHER THAN TO SYRIA.

THE IRAQIS IN JORDAN ARE BASED ON MAFRAK, JUST SOUTH OF THE SYRIAN BORDER, AND THEIR UNITS IN SYRIA ARE IN THE ADJOINING AREA ACROSS THE FRONTIER.

THE JORDANIAN, IRAQI, AND SYRIAN FORCES ALONG THE EASTERN FRONT COME UNDER A UNIFIED COMMAND.

THE SAUDIS, WHO HAVE A BRIGADE OF ABOUT 4,000 MEN BASED AT KERAK IN SOUTH JORDAN, DO NOT BELONG TO THE UNIFIED COMMAND BUT OPERATE DIRECTLY UNDER ORDERS FROM RIYADH.

SAUDI TROOPS DO HOWEVER CO-OPERATE ON AN AD HOC BASIS WITH LOCAL JORDANIAN UNITS, AS IN YESTERDAY'S SWEEP AGAINST ISRAELI FORCES OPERATING AROUND AS-SAFI SOUTH OF THE DEAD SEA.

MORE LS/TB



NNNN

1767  
CR 1432

CCA768 EPA227

1432 : NIGHTLEAD TROOPS 3 AMMAN:

MAJOR-GENERAL MOHAMMED BEN AMER, THE SAUDI COMMANDER IN JORDAN, WHO MADE TODAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT THE STRENGTHENING OF HIS FORCE, SAID THIS BUILD-UP WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL THE LAND ISRAEL OCCUPIED IN THE 1967 WAR HAD BEEN LIBERATED.

THE LINE-UP OF ARAB GROUND FORCES ALONG THE EASTERN FRONT AT PRESENT IS APPROXIMATELY: SYRIA 60,000 TROOPS, JORDAN 50,000, IRAQ 18,000, SAUDI ARABIA 4,000.

IRAQ HAS ANOTHER 50,000 TROOPS ON HER OWN TERRITORY AND SAUDI ARABIA ABOUT 24,000.

THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT ARAB AIR STRENGTH ON THE EASTERN FRONT IS SYRIA'S AIR FORCE OF ABOUT 150 SOVIET-BUILT JETS WHICH HAS BEEN SHOWING AN INCREASINGLY GOOD PERFORMANCE AGAINST THE POWERFUL ISRAELI AIR FORCE.

THERE ARE ALSO ABOUT 15,000 TO 20,000 PALESTINE COMMANDOS OPERATING AGAINST ISRAEL FROM JORDAN, SYRIA, AND LEBANON. BUT WESTERN MILITARY OBSERVERS DOUBT WHETHER MORE THAN ABOUT 1,000 OF THESE ARE NORMALLY ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS AT ANY ONE TIME.

REUTER IM/TB



APRIL 1970.

CONFIDENTIAL.

NEW 10/7

SENT M. C. (2)  
HD. OF DEFENSE (2)  
HD. OF P. U. S. D. (1)  
GR 70  
PERSONNEL COS. DEPT.  
HD. OF COS. DEPT.  
EXAM  
FILE R R 1  
NEA

ADDRESSED TO MOD (DI4) TELEGRAM NO FOH 171040Z APR 70.

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO DA BAGHDAD

FROM DA AMMAN.

A WELL PLACED RELIABLE SOURCE HAS REPORTED THE APPEARANCE OF A NEW IRAQI UNIT OF BATTALION STRENGTH PLUS IN THE AREA BR 2836.

THE SOURCE IS ENDEAVOURING TO OBTAIN UNIT IDENTIFICATION.

COMMENT: THIS COULD BE A RE-DEPLOYMENT OF A UNIT ALREADY STATIONED IN JORDAN AND NOT A REINFORCEMENT.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD (DI 4)

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCOMCEN

SIR P ADAMS

4)  $\Rightarrow$  ENT TO D.C.C.

(i) Artur undichte ~~17/4~~ 20h

(ii) Enter Freige-Zeit = 20h

2x/7

NNNN




Pl enter Foreign Troops in Jordan *22/5*

DWF E 033/21

LDL 614/21

CYPHER CAT/A  
ROUTINE AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO. FOH 210705Z



FCO GR 150

TO MOD DI4  
APRIL 1970.

16
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SENT M.O.D. ✓
HD. OF DEFENCE DEPT. (2)
HD. OF P.U.S.D.
P.U.S.D.
PERMANENT DEPT.
HD. OF COMMS. DEPT.
EXAMINERS
FILE R K 129
<i>Ad. N. East D.</i>

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO FOH 210705Z APR 70 REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO AA BAGHDAD, AA RAWALPINDI AND JIS(NE).  
FROM AA AMMAN.

*P am*  
*27/4*

DURING CONVERSATION WITH THE CDR RJAF, THE FOLLOWING POINTS OF  
INTEREST WERE NOTED:-

(A) THE NEW AIRFIELD AT AZRAQ IS NOT YET FINISHED AND THE CDR  
SAID THAT IT IS QUITE LIKELY THAT IT WILL BE USED JOINTLY BY  
THE IRAQI AIR FORCE AND THE RJAF.

(B) WHEN ASKED IF IT WAS EVER LIKELY THAT PAKISTAN AIRCRAFT  
MIGHT COME TO JORDAN, HE LAUGHED AND SAID QUOTE MOST UNLIKELY  
UNQUOTE.

(C) HE CONFIRMED THAT THERE IS A PAKISTANI WG CDR AT MAFRAQ  
HELPING THE NEW BASE CDR ON OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE  
ASPECTS. THE WG CDR IS EVIDENTLY A RECENT MIG 19 SQN CDR AND  
AN A1 QFI, ETC.

DEFCONCEN PASS ROUTINE TO DI4 AND JIS(NE)

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO DEFCONCEN AND RAWALPINDI

SIR P ADAMS



J 5/1

10/7

Miss C. Stephenson IAD

Mr. Walker  
Mr. Sutherland to see the p.a.  
Mr. Hong NED  
(P) 17/4

I am Philip,

Pakistani troops in Jordan

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,

RAWALPINDI.

1 April, 1970.

P  
28/7

(17)  
RIP  
RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY NO. 10  
NEJ 14/7  
(8)

Would you please refer to Sutherland's letter of 23 February to the Head of Chancery about Pakistani troops in Jordan.

2. There is little new to report. As I have already reported, during King Hussein's visit President Yahya was careful to make very little reference to the Pakistani contingent although King Hussein referred to "Pakistanis standing shoulder to shoulder with Jordanians on Jordanian soil".

3. The question of Pakistani troops in Jordan came up again during President Yahya's press conference which he gave yesterday following the publication of the Legal Framework Order on 30 March. According to today's English-language papers the President "emphatically denied that Pakistan had given any military assistance to Jordan to fight Israel". He described reports in the foreign press to this effect as "mischievous" and went on to explain that Pakistan had given some "training and advisory" assistance not only to Jordan but also to some other friendly countries, particularly in the Middle East. One questioner was persistent and referred to King Hussein's remarks mentioned in the paragraph above. The President merely said that it was polite of him to say that - the training assistance that Pakistan was giving Jordan had been going on for a long time. I think this is all further evidence of some back-peddalling now that the full consequences of the despatch of combat troops to Jordan have been brought home to the Pakistanis.

4. Finally, in the final paragraph of his letter Ian Sutherland asked for our comments on Mr. Kux's remarks that there had been an increase recently in pan-Islamic feeling amongst junior army officers. We would agree that there is certainly a very large measure of sympathy for the plight of Muslims in the Middle East countries affected by the war with Israel. This is not surprising in view of the fact that the press is allowed a free rein in reporting the woes of the Arabs and the sins of the Israelis. However, the Defence Adviser, who was at Quetta Staff College in 1951, questions whether the change is as marked as Mr. Kux indicated. He recalls that during his time at the Staff College he was astonished at the extreme pro-Arab feelings of the student officers there, many of whom are now serving as generals in the Pakistan Army and more fully aware of the military shortcomings of the Arab armies.

11 APR 1970  
FSP 10/7

Yours ever,  
D. H. March

P. J. Priestley, Esq.,  
South Asian Department,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.

SECRET AND GUARD



CONFIDENTIAL

18

BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

18 April 1970

(EFH/70)

The Eastern Front

Al Thaqafa, the Ba'ath Party newspaper, carried a lengthy editorial on 17 April entitled "The Eastern Front - new evidence of the conspiracy for a peaceful solution and the establishment of a military command on the front."

2. The editorial ran briefly over the history of the establishment of a military command on the Eastern Front and mentioned that in Khartoum it was decided that it should come under the command of an Iraqi Officer with a majority of Iraqi staff. There was then a passage quoting the eminent qualification of the Iraqis to play a leading role in the Eastern Command both on military and political grounds.

3. The crux of the article was however that despite these excellent decisions no such command had in effect come into being. The Iraqi Officer Commanding and his staff were in fact only concerned with the Iraqi units deployed there and other formations were not in practice obliged either to take orders from him or even to co-operate with him. The article complained that the Commander was subject to all sorts of frustrations and obstacles from other units in the area and that he was frequently prevented from carrying out his duties as if he were a person without any official standing and merely posted in one country from another. (This from our own knowledge reflects fairly accurately the personal feelings of frustration of the Commander)

4. The article went on to attack unspecified elements which it said were compelling Iraqis "who had gone there to defend that country" to take up positions only in places defined by those elements. In certain cases these places had been on high ground and open spaces which were vulnerable to heavy Israeli bombing and an easy target. Further, the local population was accused


/of

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O., London S.W.1.

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of denying the Iraqi soldiers shelter when under bombardment and of charging them for, and on occasion even denying them, water and electricity.

5. No indication was given of which country was particularly being attacked in the article, although of course the majority of the Iraqi forces under the Eastern Command are stationed in Jordan. Given the almost open hostility between the Iraqis and the Syrians it may just conceivably be Syria which Al Thawra had in mind. However, if this were so one would expect some laudatory reference to be made to the Jordanians for not placing such obstacles in the way of the Iraqi command.

6. The article then went on to refute the charge that the Iraqi government was not fulfilling its obligations on the Eastern Front and the writer said that the annual expenses incurred by the Iraqi units on the Eastern Front involved a payment from the Iraqi budget exceeding I.D. 60 million a year.

7. The article is a strange one and has already been interpreted by the Daily Telegraph, we understand, as a general attack by Iraq on its neighbours. There have been several stories since the beginning of the year of dissatisfaction between the members of the Eastern command and of pressure by the Iraqis on the others to increase their support and conversely of Iraqi movements of forces to supplement their expeditionary force in Jordan and Syria. There is no indication as yet that the article in Al Thawra represents any intention by the Iraqis to change their general policy towards the Eastern Command, but the end of the article does include a rather cryptic remark that in making these points the Ba'ath Party was not talking to the masses in Iraq who well understood the attitude of the party in supporting the Eastern Front, but was submitting them to the masses in the other Arab countries. This bears all the marks of an appeal over the respective governments' heads to the peoples in Jordan and Syria. We shall have to see if this is developed.

copied to: Chancery, Amman,  
Beirut,  
Cairo.

(J. H. Symons)

CONFIDENTIAL

I doubt it.  
I don't  
think the  
Israelis  
have bombed  
the Iraqis  
in Syria.

R.E.

27/4.

17th Nov  
The  
D.T.  
is  
quite  
clear



792/3

1575

PRIORITY 0 CRS

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCONCEN



20

SECRET

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22 MAY 1978

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HD. OF COMMS. DEPT.

EXAMINERS

FILE R K 129

*Handwritten signature*

NEJ 10/7

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY

TELNO AA 141

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO H O D ( AIR) LONDON PLEASE PASS TEL NO AA 141  
OF 22 MAY AND TO D A AMMAN ( LONDON PLEASE PASS) RFI TO  
AAA KARACHI.

MOD ( AIR) FOR DI2. AMMAN FOR D A.

*Handwritten signature*  
2/6

GERMAN MA HAS HEARD A RUNOUR FROM WHAT HE CALLS A FAIRLY  
RELIABLE SOURCE THAT 20 - 24 ( TWENTY TO TWENTY FOUR )  
F 86 AIRCRAFT HAVE OR ARE BEING TRANSFERRED FROM PAKISTAN TO  
JORDAN. AMERICANS ARE INVESTIGATING THEMSELVES. IN VIEW  
OF RECENT GENERAL CONVERGATIONS I HAVE HAD WITH C IN C P A F  
AND C O S ARMY I CONSIDER THIS MOST UNLIKELY BUT WOULD  
BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY INFORMATION OR COMMENTS.

NEJ (No Lang) Have you seen this?

No: most useful

Pl. enter Foreign Troops

in Jordan 1000  
27/5

Thom

Defence Dept

26/5



# CYPHER

*Pl enter in  
28/5*

*(2)*

**SECRET**

*pr  
in  
2/6*

FDME 437/87

LDL 477/27 FF FCG

1700

CYPHER CAT A

PRIORITY AIRMAIL

TELEGRAM NO FCG 270215Z

TO AA RAWALPINDI

DAY 1576

SECRET

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EXAMINERS
FILE R K 129
<i>Hd. N. East D.</i>

ADDRESSED TO AA RAWALPINDI TELEGRAM NO FCG 270215Z DATED  
27 MAY 1970 AND TO MOD AIR (D12) REPEATED FOR INFORMATION  
TO AA KARACHI

FROM DA ADAMS.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
20 MAY 1970
<i>NEJ 3/307/1</i>

YOUR TEL NO AA/141 OF 22 MAY 70 REFERS.

IN RECENT CONVERSATION WITH CDR RUAR HE SAID IT WAS QUOTE MOST  
UNLIKELY UNQUOTE THAT ANY PAF AIRCRAFT WOULD EVER BE BASED IN  
JORDAN.

*NEJ 10/7.*

DEFCON/CEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD AIR (D12)

FCG PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCONCEN, RAWALPINDI AND KARACHI.

SIR F ADAMS

*(Unrecorded or recorded)*

**SECRET**

SENT TO D.C.C.

*1/1*



CYPHER CAT A

ROUTINE AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO FOH 261030Z

TO CAIRO

AUG 1970

*Pl. enter French  
troops in Jordan*

*27/8*

24

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ADDRESSED TO DA CAIRO TELEGRAM NO FOH 261030Z DATED 26/8/70  
REPTD FOR INFORMATION TO MOD ARMY.

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10

27 AUG 1970

NEJ 10/7

*per  
27/8*

FROM DA AMMAN.

MY TEL NO FOH 260750Z..

HIS PAKISTAN COLLEAGUE INFORMED MY AMBASSADOR A FEW DAYS AGO THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM THREE SEPERATE AND NORMALLY RELIABLE SOURCES THAT TWO THOUSAND EGYPTIAN SOLDIERS HAD ARRIVED IN JORDAN TO ASSIST THE KING IN DEALING WITH THE IRAQI TROOPS HERE. THE PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR CONFESSED HIMSELF PUZZLED SINCE NONE OF THE PAKISTAN MILITARY OR CIVIL AVIATION OFFICIALS WHO ARE PRESENT AT ALL LIKELY ARRIVAL POINTS (EXCEPT AQABA) COULD CONFIRM THE STORY. WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING SINCE TO SUBSTANTIATE THIS IMPROBABLE STORY.

DEFCONCEN PASS ROUTINE TO MOD ARMY

FCO PASS ROUTINE DEFCONCEN

MR PHILLIPS

NNNN

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P.U.S.D.  
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HD. OF COM. NS. DEPT.  
EXAMINERS  
FILE R K 129



CYPHER CAT/A

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY AMMAN

TO MODUK

TELEGRAM NO FOH 011100Z

SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO MODUK ARMY TELEGRAM NO FOH 011100Z SEP 70 REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO DA BAGHDAD DA BEIRUT AND FCO.  
FROM DA AMMAN.

RECEIVED  
REGISTRY No 10  
NEJ 10/7

IRAQI TROOP MOVEMENTS.

DURING THE LAST WEEK WE HAVE HEARD RUMOURS FROM TWO  
CORRESPONDENTS, ONE ATTACHE AND PALACE CIRCLES OF THE MOVEMENT OF  
IRAQI TROOPS STATIONED IN SYRIA SOUTHWARDS INTO JORDAN.  
THE FIGURE OF EIGHTEEN THOUSAND AS THE CURRENT TOTAL OF IRAQI  
TROOPS NOW IN JORDAN HAS BEEN MENTIONED. WE CANNOT CONFIRM THESE  
RUMOURS, BUT CONSIDER THAT SUCH A MOVE IS QUITE LIKELY NOW THAT  
HQ EASTERN FRONT IS BEING DISBANDED. IT SEEMS LIKELY IN THE  
PRESENT SITUATION FOR ANY IRAQI TROOPS JUST NORTH OF THE JORDANIAN  
BORDER TO BE PULLED BACK TO COME UNDER JORDANIAN COMMAND.

CORRESPONDENTS INFER THAT SUCH A MOVE WILL ENABLE IRAQI PRESSURE  
ON THE JORDANIAN REGIME TO BE INCREASED IF CONSIDERED NECESSARY  
BUT WE CONSIDER THAT THIS THINKING IS MISTAKEN AT THIS TIME.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI4

pa am  
2/9

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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- N.A.D.
- ARAB. D.
- U.N.D.
- DEFENCE D.
- P.U.S.D.
- NEWS D.
- M.O.D. (INTERNAL)

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LAST PAPER

26



BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

Poss 3  
Confirmed by telephone

Centre (S) enter

Mr Long 3/5

Mr. Hughes 3/5

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IRD

PUSD (CABINET OFFICE)

RESIDENT (M.E.J.F.U.)

29 August 1970

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10

(D.4)

NEJ 10/7

Jan Rato,

Iraq and the Eastern Front

In a speech on 27 August Taha al Jazrawi, member of the R.C.C. and Minister of Industry said that "after the withdrawal of the U.A.R., Syria and Jordan officially from the Front" the Eastern Front had come to mean only the Iraqi Army and the Commando Organizations. He added that Iraq had sent a message to the former Commander in Chief of the Eastern Front pointing out the serious political and military harm that would result from this move. Sd. Jazrawi went on to repeat Iraq's support for the Commandos.

2. This is the first Iraqi reaction to the decision two weeks ago that forces previously under the Eastern Front Command in Jordan and Syria should not be placed under the command of King Hussein and President Atassi respectively. Previous Iraqi comment on the Front, such as it was, had ignored this decision altogether.

3. The reference to the commandos is perhaps significant. Iraq had not previously to my knowledge, even implied that the commandos were a constituent part of the Eastern Front. The Iraqis' claim that they are may now be used as an umbrella for their promised support to the commandos. Whether this implies that they intend to support the commandos in their operations against Israel rather than in any clash with the Jordanian authorities remains to be seen.

LAST PAPER

(M K Jenner)

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

CONFIDENTIAL

cc. Chancery, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Tel Aviv.